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Abstract
In this paper, we have studied the pricing of a continuously collateralized CDS. We
have made use of the ”survival measure” to derive the pricing formula in a straightfor-
ward way. As a result, we have found that there exists irremovable trace of the counter
party as well as the investor in the price of CDS through their default dependence
even under the perfect collateralization, although the hazard rates of the two parties
are totally absent from the pricing formula. As an important implication, we have also
studied the situation where the investor enters an offsetting back-to-back trade with
another counter party. We have provided simple numerical examples to demonstrate
the change of a fair CDS premium according to the strength of default dependence
among the relevant names, and then discussed its possible implications for the risk
management of the central counter parties.
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1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis, exemplified by the collapse of Lehman Brothers, is the major
driver of the increased use of collateral agreements based on CSA (credit support annex
published by ISDA), which is now almost a market standard among financial institu-
tions [10]. Coupled with the explosion of various basis spreads, such as Libor-OIS and the
cross currency swap (CCS) basis, the effects of collateralization on the derivative pricing,
particularly from the view point of funding costs, have become important research topics.
Johannes & Sundaresan (2007) [11] have first emphasized the cost of collateral using swap
rates in U.S. market. In a series of works Fujii & Takahashi (2009, 2010) [5, 6, 7], we have
developed a framework of interest-rate modeling in the presence of collateralization and
multiple currencies. We have also pointed out the importance of choice of collateral cur-
rency and the embedded cheapest-to-deliver option in collateral agreements [8]. Piterbarg
(2010) [12] discussed the general issue of option pricing under collateralization.
This financial crisis has also brought about serious research activity on the credit
derivatives and counter party default risk, and large amount of research papers have been
published since the crisis. The regulators have also been working hard to establish the
new rules for the counter party risk management, and also for the migration toward the
CCPs (central counter parties) particularly in the CDS (credit default swap) market.
The excellent reviews and collections of recent works are available in the books edited by
Lipton & Rennie [4] and Bielecki, Brigo & Patras [1], for example. However, the effects of
collateralization on credit derivatives remain still largely unclear. It seems partly because
that the idea of collateral cost appeared only recently, and also because the detailed
collateral modeling is very complicated, due to the existence of settlement lag, threshold,
and minimum transfer amount, e.t.c..
In this paper, based on the market development toward more stringent collateral man-
agement requiring a daily (or even intra-day) margin call, we have studied the pricing of
CDS under the assumption of continuous collateralization. This is expected to be particu-
larly relevant for the CCPs dealing with CDS and other credit linked products, for which
the assumption of continuous collateralization seems to be a reasonable proxy of the real-
ity. Although we have studied the similar issues for the standard fixed income derivatives
in the previous work [9], the result cannot be directly applied to the credit derivatives
since the behavior of hazard rates generally violates the so called ”no-jump” condition
(e.g. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein & Hugonnier (2004) [2]) if there exists non-trivial default
dependence among the relevant parties. In this work, we apply the technique introduced
by Scho¨nbucher (2000) [13] and adopted later by [2] in order to eliminate the necessity of
this condition.
As a result, we have obtained a simple pricing formula for the collateralized CDS.
We will see, under the perfect collateralization, that the CDS price does not depend
on the counter party hazard rates at all as expected. However, very interestingly, there
remains irremovable trace of the two counter parties through the default dependence. This
gives rise to a very difficult question about the appropriate pricing method for CCPs. A
CCP acts as a buyer as well as a seller of a given CDS at the same time, by entering a
back-to-back trade between the two financial firms. However, the result tells us that the
mark-to-market values of the two offsetting CDSs are not equal in general even at the time
of inception, if the CCP adopts the same price for the two firms. Although the detailed
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work will be left in a separate paper, we think that the result has important implications
for the proper operations of CCPs for credit derivatives.
2 Fundamental Pricing Formula
2.1 Setup
We consider a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F, Q), whereQ is a spot martingale measure,
and F = {Ft ; t ≥ 0} is a sub-σ-algebra of F satisfying the usual conditions. We denote the
set of relevant firms C = {0, 1, 2, ..., n} and introduce a strictly positive random variable
τ i in the probability space as the default time of each party i ∈ C. We define the default
indicator process of each party as H it = 1{τ i≤t} and denote by H
i the filtration generated
by this process. We assume that we are given a background filtration G containing other
information except defaults and write F = G ∨ H0 ∨ H1 ∨ · · · ∨ Hn. Thus, it is clear that
τ i is an Hi as well as F stopping time. We assume the existence of non-negative hazard
rate process hi where
M it = H
i
t −
∫ t
0
his1{τ i>s}ds, t ≥ 0 (2.1)
is an (Q,F)-martingale. We also assume that there is no simultaneous default for simplicity.
For collateralization, we assume the same setup adopted in [9] and repeat it here once
again for convenience: Consider a trade between the party 1 and 2. If the party i (∈ {1, 2})
has a negative mark-to-market value, it has to post the cash collateral 1 to the counter party
j (6= i), where the coverage ratio of the exposure is denoted by δit ∈ R+. We assume the
margin call and settlement occur instantly. Party j is then a collateral receiver and has to
pay collateral rate cit on the posted amount of collateral, which is δ
i
t×(|mark-to-market|), to
the party i. This is done continuously until the end of the contract. Following the market
conventions, we set the collateral rate cit as the time-t value of overnight (O/N) rate of the
collateral currency used by the party i. It is not equal to the risk-free rate rt, in general,
which is necessary to make the system consistent with the cross currency market 2. We
denote the recovery rate of the party i by Rit ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that all the processes
except default times, such as {ci, r, δi, Ri} are adapted to the background filtration G. As
for the details of exposure to the counter party and the recovery scheme, see [9].
2.2 CDS Pricing
We denote the CDS reference name by party-0, the investor by party-1, and the counter
party by party-2, respectively. Let us define τ = τ0∧τ1∧τ2 and its corresponding indicator
process, Ht = 1{τ≤t}. We assume that the investor is a protection buyer and party-2 is a
seller. Under this setup, the CDS price from the view point of the investor can be written
1According to the ISDA survey [10], more than 80% of collateral being used is cash. If there is a liquid
repo or security-lending market, we may also carry out similar formulation with proper adjustments of its
funding cost.
2See Ref. [8] for details.
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as
St = βtE
Q
[∫
]t,T ]
β−1u 1{τ>u}
(
dDu + q(u, Su)Sudu
)
+
∫
]t,T ]
β−1u 1{τ≥u}
(
Z0udH
0
u + Z
1(u, Su−)dH
1
u + Z
2(u, Su−)dH
2
u
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
, (2.2)
where D denotes the cumulative dividend process representing the premium payment for
the CDS, and βt = exp
(∫ t
0 rsds
)
denotes the money-market account with the risk-free
interest rate. Other variables are defined as follows (See also [9] for details.):
q(t, v) = δ1t y
1
t 1{v<0} + δ
2
t y
2
t 1{v≥0}
Z0t = (1−R
0
t )
Z1(t, v) =
(
1− (1−R1t )(1− δ
1
t )
+
)
v1{v<0} +
(
1 + (1−R1t )(δ
2
t − 1)
+
)
v1{v≥0}
Z2(t, v) =
(
1− (1−R2t )(1− δ
2
t )
+
)
v1{v≥0} +
(
1 + (1−R2t )(δ
1
t − 1)
+
)
v1{v<0} .
Here, yit = r
i
t − c
i
t is the difference of the risk-free and collateral rates relevant for the
collateral currency chosen by the party-i at the time t, which represents the instantaneous
return of the posted collateral. Thus the term q(t, v) summarizes the return (or cost)
of collateral from the view point of the investor. Zi represents the default payoff when
party-i defaults first among the set {0, 1, 2}.
Although we can follow the same procedures used in the previous work [9] based on the
arguments of Duffie & Huang (1996) [3], we need a careful treatment to avoid the jump
in the value process at the time of counter party default 3. In this work, we apply the
measure change technique introduced by Scho¨nbucher [13] and used by Collin-Dufresne
et.al. (2004) [2], which leads to the following proposition in a clearcut way.
Proposition 1 Under the assumptions given in 2.1 and appropriate integrability condi-
tions, the pre-default value Vt corresponding to the CDS contract specified in Eq. (2.2) is
given by
Vt = E
Q′
[∫
]t,T ]
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
(
ru − µ(u, Vu) + h
0
u
)
du
)(
dDs + Z
0
sh
0
sds
)∣∣∣∣∣F ′t
]
, (2.3)
where
µ(u, v) =
(
y1t δ
1
t − (1−R
1
t )(1− δ
1
t )
+h1t + (1−R
2
t )(δ
1
t − 1)
+h2t
)
1{v<0}
+
(
y2t δ
2
t − (1−R
2
t )(1− δ
2
t )
+h2t + (1−R
1
t )(δ
2
t − 1)
+h1t
)
1{v≥0} , (2.4)
and it satisfies St = 1{τ>t}Vt for all t ≥ 0. Here, the ”survival measure” Q
′ is defined by
dQ′
dQ
∣∣∣∣
Ft
=
2∏
i=0
1{τ i>t} exp
(∫ t
0
2∑
i=0
hisds
)
(2.5)
and the filtration F′ = (F ′t)t≥0 denotes the augmentation of F under Q
′.
3See the remark just after the proposition 1 in [9].
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Proof: Using the Doob-Meyer decomposition, one obtains
St = βtE
Q
[∫
]t,T ]
β−1u 1{τ>u}
(
dDu + q(u, Su)Sudu
)
+
∫ T
t
β−1u 1{τ>u}
(
Z0uh
0
u + Z
1(u, Su)h
1
u + Z
2
u(u, Su)h
2
u
)
du
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
. (2.6)
Let us define
ηt =
dQ′
dQ
∣∣∣∣
Ft
= 1{τ>t}Λt , (2.7)
where we have used
Λt = exp
(∫ t
0
h˜sds
)
. (2.8)
and h˜s =
∑2
i=0 h
i
s. Then, we can proceed as
St = βtE
Q
[∫
]t,T ]
(βuΛu)
−1 ηu
(
dDu + q(u, Su)Sudu
)
+
∫ T
t
(βuΛu)
−1 ηu
(
Z0uh
0
u + Z
1(u, Su)h
1
u + Z
2(u, Su)h
2
u
)
du
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= 1{τ>t}E
Q′
[∫
]t,T ]
βtΛt
βuΛu
{
dDu +
(
q(u, Su)Su + Z
0
uh
0
u + Z
1(u, Su)h
1
u + Z
2(u, Su)h
2
u
)
du
}∣∣∣∣∣F ′t
]
.
Thus, on the set {τ > t}, we can write
Vt = E
Q′
[∫
]t,T ]
βtΛt
βuΛu
{
dDu +
(
q(u, Vu)Vu + Z
0
uh
0
u + Z
1(u, Vu)h
1
u + Z
2(u, Vu)h
2
u
)
du
}∣∣∣∣∣F ′t
]
.
Simple algebra gives us
Vt = E
Q′
[∫
]t,T ]
e−
∫ s
t
(ru+h˜u)du
{
dDs + Z
0
sh
0
sds+
(
h˜s − h
0
s + µ(s, Vs)
)
Vsds
}∣∣∣∣∣F ′t
]
.
Integrating the linear terms gives us the desired result. 
Now, the method used in [9] gives us the CDS valuation formula under various situa-
tions of collateralization. Let us summarize some of the useful results here:
Corollary 1 Assume the perfect and symmetric collateralization with domestic currency
(δ1 = δ2 = 1, y1 = y2 = y). Then, we have
Vt = E
Q′
[∫
]t,T ]
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
(cu + h
0
u)du
)(
dDs + Z
0
sh
0
sds
)∣∣∣∣∣F ′t
]
(2.9)
as the pre-default value of the CDS given in Eq (2.2).
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Corollary 2 Assume the perfect and symmetric collateralization but the collateral cur-
rency (j) 4 is different from the evaluation currency (i). In this case, we have
Vt = E
Q′
(i)
[∫
]t,T ]
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
(c(i)u + y
(i,j)
u + h
0
u)du
)(
dDs + Z
0
sh
0
sds
)∣∣∣∣∣F ′t
]
(2.10)
where y(i,j) = y(i) − y(j). Q(i) and the associated Q
′
(i) denote the measure related to the
money-market account of currency (i).
Notice that, as we have demonstrated in the work [8], the term structure of y(i,j), which is
the spread of collateral cost between the two currencies, can easily be bootstrapped from
the cross currency swap information in the market.
It is also straightforward to derive the leading order approximation under the imperfect
collateralization, or δi 6= 1, using the Gateaux derivative. See [9] for the details.
Corollary 3 Assume symmetric collateralization with domestic currency, but consider
the imperfect collateralization δit 6= 1. In this case, in the leading order approximation, we
have
Vt ≃ V t + (∇V )
1
t + (∇V )
2
t (2.11)
where
V t = E
Q′
[∫
]t,T ]
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
(cu + h
0
u)du
)(
dDs + Z
0
sh
0
sds
)∣∣∣∣∣F ′t
]
(2.12)
and
(∇V )1t = E
Q′
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
(cu+h0u)duys
{
(1− δ1s)[−V s]
+ − (1− δ2s)[V s]
+
}
ds
∣∣∣∣F ′t
]
(2.13)
(∇V )2t = E
Q′
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
(cu+h0u)du(1−R1s)h
1
s
{
(1− δ1s)
+[−V s]
+ + (δ2s − 1)
+[V s]
+
}
ds
∣∣∣∣F ′t
]
− EQ
′
[∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t
(cu+h0u)du(1−R2s)h
2
s
{
(1− δ2s)
+[V s]
+ + (δ1s − 1)
+[−V s]
+
}
ds
∣∣∣∣F ′t
]
.
(2.14)
In the previous work [9], we have interpreted (∇V )1t as CCA (collateral cost adjustment)
and (∇V )2t as CVA. Although it still seems a reasonable interpretation, we need to be more
careful about the interpretation of V t, the CDS value under the perfect collateralization.
In fact, in the reminder of the paper, we will concentrate on this value and we will soon
realize that the proper understanding of this simplest situation is quite non-trivial and
critical for the risk management of CDS trades.
4We use ”()” to denote the currency type instead of counter party.
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3 Financial Implications
Let us concentrate on the simplest case, where the symmetric and perfect collateralization
is done continuously with domestic currency. As we have seen, the pre-default value of
the CDS is given by
Vt = E
Q′
[∫
]t,T ]
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
(cu + h
0
u)du
)(
dDs + Z
0
sh
0
sds
)∣∣∣∣∣F ′t
]
(3.1)
and one can easily confirm that the hazard rates of the investor 1 as well as the counter
party 2 are absent from the pricing formula. Naively, it looks as if we succeed to recover
the risk-free situation by the stringent collateral management. However, we will just see
that it is quite misleading and dangerous to treat the result of Eq. (3.1) as the usual
risk-free pricing formula.
The key point resides in the new measure Q′ and the filtration F′. As was emphasized
in the works [13, 2], the transformation in Eq. (2.5) puts zero weight on the events where
the parties {0, 1, 2} default. It can be easily checked as follows: By construction, we know
that
Mt = Ht −
∫ t
0
(1−Hs)h˜sds (3.2)
is a (Q,F)-martingale. Then, Maruyama-Girsanov’s theorem implies that
M ′t =Mt −
∫ t
0
d〈M,η〉s
ηs−
(3.3)
should be a (Q′,F′)-martingale, where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the (conditional or predictable) quadratic
covariation. Now, one can easily check that
M ′t = Mt +
∫ t
0
(1−Hs)h˜sds
= Ht (3.4)
and thus Ht = 1{τ≤t} itself becomes a (Q
′,F′)-martingale. In other words, under the new
measure, the parties {0, 1, 2} do not default almost surely.
Let us consider the financial implications of this fact. By our construction of filtration,
(Q,F) hazard rate process of party i can be written in the following form in general:
hit =
∑
{D∈Π; i 6∈D}
∏
j∈D
1{τ j≤t}
∏
k∈C\D
1{τk>t}h
i
D(t) (3.5)
where Π denotes the set of all the subgroups of C = {0, 1, 2, · · · , n} including also the
empty set. Let us define HD =
∏
j∈D ∨H
k, then hiD(t) is adapted to the filtration G∨H
D,
and hence includes the information of default times of the parties included in the set D
although they are not explicitly shown in the formula. Importantly, it is not the hazard
rate (or default intensity) under the new measure (Q′,F′).
In the new measure, the parties included in S = {0, 1, 2} are almost surely alive for all
t ≥ 0, and hence hit given in Eq. (3.5) is equivalent to h
′i
t given below:
h′it =
∑
{D∈Π′; i 6∈D}
∏
j∈D
1{τ j≤t}
∏
k∈C′\D
1{τk>t}h
i
D(t) (3.6)
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where C′ = C\S, and Π′ denotes the set of all the subgroups of C′ and the empty set.
Thus, the pre-default value of the CDS can also be written as
Vt = E
Q′
[∫
]t,T ]
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
(cu + h
′0
u )du
)(
dDs + Z
0
sh
′0
s ds
)∣∣∣∣∣F ′t
]
. (3.7)
Now, let us consider the difference from the situation where the same CDS is being traded
between the two completely default risk free parties. In this case, the pre-default value of
the CDS is given by
V rft = E
Q
[∫
]t,T ]
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
(cu + h
0
u)du
)(
dDs + Z
0
sh
0
sds
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
. (3.8)
Here, we have assumed that the collateralization is still being carried out. It is now clear
that the most important quantity to understand is
V rft − Vt . (3.9)
Considering t = 0 allows us to have a better image. In this case, V rf0 can be simply
obtained by the knowledge of marginal default distribution of the reference entity. On
the other hand, V0 does not contain the contribution from the scenarios where the parties
included in the set S default in the future, and hence the value of protection from the
CDS becomes smaller than the former one.
In order to understand this fact, it is instructive to consider the predictable nature
of collateralization. Even under the perfect collateralization, the party can only recover
the contract value just before the default of the counter party. In the case of non-credit
sensitive products, such as the standard interest rate swaps e.t.c., it does not cause any
problem and we can consider the valuation just as if we are in risk-free world once we
take the cost of collateral into account appropriately. However, in the case of credit
derivatives, the contract value is expected to change discretely following the jump of the
relevant hazard rate because of the direct feedback or contagious effect from the counter
party default. Although the marginal default intensity contains the contribution from all
the scenarios, the investor cannot receive this value in reality. In addition, the investor
cannot receive any return caused by his default and all the following events after it. Thus,
the quantity V rf−V can be interpreted as the net discounted value that should be obtained
by the investor if he and his counter party were default free.
It is easy to imagine that the quantity is determined by the size of the price jump
caused by contagious (or feedback) effects from the defaults of the two parties and hence
the default dependence among the relevant names. Although it is difficult to obtain the
difference in a generic situation, we will demonstrate its significance in a simple but im-
portant setup in the following sections.
Remark: In the market, the claim to the defaulted entity is to be made just after the
default event. Thus, some additional value may be recovered on top of the collateral
amount, because the claim is based on the market value after the default. This additional
claim can be interpreted as the substitution cost, but the proper theoretical handling is
difficult since it does depend on the choice of the next counter party and the exact timing of
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execution. Although ISDA document allows to include the cost of actual replacements, it
is now clear that this is a huge burden of complicated litigious works on the administrator
of the defaulted company. Since it is very difficult to prove the cost of replacement claimed
by the creditors, such as the bid/offer spreads at the time of executions, is actually fair.
It also crucially depends on whether the set of trades were unwound in a net basis or
one-by-one, which should have a significant impact on the modeling of recovery scheme.
According to the recent article [16], the settlement of claims against Lehman Brothers
has completed only 11% up to now. It seems that we need a clear rule to guarantee the
fairness among the creditors and to speed up the settlement process. Once the detailed
procedures and the rights of a creditor are finely defined, more accurate recovery handling
will be possible.
4 Special Cases
We first list up the two special cases which provide us better understanding. Especially,
the second example can be applied to the back-to-back trade, which is the most relevant
situation for the CCPs.
4.1 3-party Case
The simplest situation to calculate the collateralized CDS is the case where there are only
three relevant names, C = {0, 1, 2}, which are the reference entity, the investor and the
counter party, respectively. In this case, since S = C, the set Π′ contains only the empty
set {∅}. Thus, under the survival measure (Q′,F′), we have
h′it = h
i
{∅}(t) (4.1)
and particularly,
h′0t = h
0
{∅}(t) . (4.2)
Since we know that hi{∅} is adapted to the background filtration G, the evaluation of CDS
value is quite straightforward in this case.
4.2 4-party Case
Now, let us add one more party and consider the 4-party case, C = {0, 1, 2, 3}. We first
consider the trade of a CDS between the investor (party-1) and the counter party (party-
2). The reference entity is party-0. In this case, we have C′ = {3}. Therefore, the relevant
processes under the survival measure are
h′0t = 1{τ3>t}h
0
{∅}(t) + 1{τ3≤t}h
0
{3}(t, τ
3) (4.3)
h′3t = 1{τ3>t}h
3
{∅}(t) . (4.4)
Here, we have made the dependence on the default time in h0{3} explicitly. Since the
feedback effect only appears through the party 3 in the survival measure, we can proceed
in similar fashion done in Ref. [2].
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In this case, the perfectly collateralized CDS pre-default value turns out to be
Vt = 1{τ3≤t}E
Q′
[∫
]t,T ]
e
−
∫ s
t
(
cu+h0{3}(u,τ
3)
)
du
(
dDs + Z
0
sh
0
{3}(s, τ
3)ds
)∣∣∣∣∣F ′t
]
+1{τ3>t}
{
EQ
′
[∫
]t,T ]
e
−
∫ s
t
(
cu+h0{∅}(u)
)
du
(
e
−
∫ s
t
h3
{∅}
(u)du
)(
dDs + Z
0
sh
0
{∅}(s)ds
)∣∣∣∣∣F ′t
]
+EQ
′
[∫
]t,T ]
e−
∫ s
t
cudu
(∫ s
t
e
−
(∫ v
t
h0
{∅}
(u)+
∫ s
v
h0
{3}
(u,v)
)
du
[
e
−
∫ v
t
h3
{∅}
(x)dx
h3{∅}(v)
]
dv
)
dDs
∣∣∣∣∣F ′t
]
+EQ
′
[∫
]t,T ]
e−
∫ s
t
cudu
(∫ s
t
e
−
(∫ v
t
h0
{∅}
(u)+
∫ s
v
h0
{3}
(u,v)
)
du
[
e
−
∫ v
t
h3{∅}(x)dxh3{∅}(v)
]
h0{3}(s, v)dv
)
Z0sds
∣∣∣∣∣F ′t
]}
.
(4.5)
Here, the important point is not the possible contagious effect from the party-3, but rather
the lack of the contagious effects from the other names included in the set S, which are
included in the marginal default intensity of the reference entity.
Now, because of the symmetry, if the investor enters a back-to-back trade with the
counter party 3, the pre-default value of this offsetting contract is given as follows:
V B2Bt = −1{τ2≤t}E
Q′′
[∫
]t,T ]
e
−
∫ s
t
(
cu+h0{2}(u,τ
2)
)
du
(
dDs + Z
0
sh
0
{2}(s, τ
2)ds
)∣∣∣∣∣F ′′t
]
−1{τ2>t}
{
EQ
′′
[∫
]t,T ]
e
−
∫ s
t
(
cu+h0{∅}(u)
)
du
(
e
−
∫ s
t
h2
{∅}
(u)du
)(
dDs + Z
0
sh
0
{∅}(s)ds
)∣∣∣∣∣F ′′t
]
+EQ
′′
[∫
]t,T ]
e−
∫ s
t
cudu
(∫ s
t
e
−
(∫ v
t
h0
{∅}
(u)+
∫ s
v
h0
{2}
(u,v)
)
du
[
e
−
∫ v
t
h2
{∅}
(x)dx
h2{∅}(v)
]
dv
)
dDs
∣∣∣∣∣F ′′t
]
+EQ
′′
[∫
]t,T ]
e−
∫ s
t
cudu
(∫ s
t
e
−
(∫ v
t
h0
{∅}
(u)+
∫ s
v
h0
{2}
(u,v)
)
du
[
e
−
∫ v
t
h2
{∅}
(x)dx
h2{∅}(v)
]
h0{2}(s, v)dv
)
Z0sds
∣∣∣∣∣F ′′t
]}
.
(4.6)
Here, Q′′ is defined according to the new survival set SB2B = {0, 1, 3} by
dQ′′
dQ
∣∣∣∣
Ft
=
∏
i∈SB2B
1{τ i>t} exp

∫ t
0
∑
i∈SB2B
hisds

 (4.7)
and the filtration F′′ = (F ′′t )t≥0 denotes the augmentation of F under Q
′′.
Now let us consider V0+V
B2B
0 . It is easy to check that it is not zero in general and does
depend on the default intensities of party-2 and -3, and also their contagious effects to the
reference entity. Suppose that the investor is a CCP just entered into the back-to-back
trade with the party-2 and -3 who have the same marginal default intensities. Even under
the perfect collateralization, if the CCP applies the same CDS price (or premium) to the
two parties, it has, in general, the mark-to-market loss or profit even at the inception
of the contract. For example, consider the case where the protection seller (party-2) has
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very high default dependence with the reference entity, while the buyer (party-3) of the
protection from the CCP has smaller one. In this case, the h0 in (Q′,F′) should be smaller
than that of (Q′′,F′′). If the CCP uses the same CDS premium to the two parties, CCP
should properly recognizes the loss, which stems from the difference of the contagion size
from the default of the two parties. Since the party 2 has high default dependence, the
short protection position of the CCP with the party 3 suffers bigger loss at the time of
the default of the party 2.
5 Examples using a Copula
In order to separate the marginal intensity and default dependence, we will adopt here
the copula framework. After explaining the general setup, we will apply Clayton copula
to demonstrate quantitative impact.
5.1 Framework
Suppose that we are given a non-negative process λi adapted to the background filtration
G for each party i ∈ C = {0, 1, 2, · · · , n}. Suppose also that there exists a uniformly
distributed random variable U i ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that, under (Q,F0), the (n + 1)-
dimensional random vector
~U = (U0, U1, · · · , Un) (5.1)
is distributed according to the (n+ 1)-dimensional copula
C(~u) . (5.2)
We further assume that ~U is independent from G∞ and also that copula function C is
(n+ 1)-times continuously differentiable.
Now, let us define the default time τ i as
τ i = inf
{
t; e−
∫ t
0
λisds ≤ U i
}
. (5.3)
Then, given the information G∞, one obtains the joint default distribution as
Q
(
τ0 > T 0, τ1 > T 1, · · · , τn > T n
∣∣∣G∞) = C(~γ(~T )) (5.4)
where we have used the notation of
C
(
~γ(~T )
)
= C
(
γ0(T 0), · · · , γn(T n)
)
(5.5)
and
γi(T ) = exp
(
−
∫ T
0
λisds
)
. (5.6)
Following the well known procedures 5, one obtains
Qi(t, T ) = Q
(
1{τ i>T i}
∣∣Ft)
=
∑
{D∈Π; i 6∈D}
∏
j∈D
1{τ j≤t}
∏
k∈C\D
1{τk>t}
EQ
[
~∂DC
(
γi(T i), ~γC\{D,i}(t), ~γD(~tD)
)∣∣∣Gt]
~∂DC
(
~γC\D(t), ~γD(~tD)
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
~tD=~τD
.
(5.7)
5See, the works[14, 15], for example.
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Here, we have defined Π as the set containing all the subgroups of C with the empty set,
and
~∂D =
∏
i∈D
∂
∂ui
. (5.8)
~γD( ~τD) is the set of γi(τ i) for all i ∈ D, and similarly for ~γC\D. In the expression of
Eq. (5.7), we have not properly ordered the arguments of the copula function just for
simplicity, which should be understood in the appropriate way.
(Q,F) hazard rate of party-i is calculated as
hit = −
∂
∂T
lnQi(t, T )
∣∣∣∣
T=t
= λitγ
i(t)
∑
{D∈Π; i 6∈D}
∏
j∈D
1{τ j≤t}
∏
k∈C\D
1{τk>t}
∂i~∂DC
(
~γC\D(t), ~γD(~τD)
)
~∂DC
(
~γC\D(t), ~γD(~τD)
) . (5.9)
Hence, as we have done in Eq (3.6) for the survival set S = {0, 1, 2}, hit can be replaced
as follows under the new measure (Q′,F′):
h′it = λ
i
tγ
i(t)
∑
{D∈Π′; i 6∈D}
∏
j∈D
1{τ j≤t}
∏
k∈C′\D
1{τk>t}
∂i~∂DC
(
~γC\D(t), ~γD(~τD)
)
~∂DC
(
~γC\D(t), ~γD(~τD)
) , (5.10)
where C′ = C\S and Π′ is the set of all the subgroups of C′ with an additional empty set.
One can observe that both hi and h′i are equal to the marginal intensity λi if there is no
default dependence (or in the case of the product copula).
Now, let us apply the copula framework to the two special cases given in Sec. 4.
(3-party Case): In the 3-party case with C = {0, 1, 2}, we have
h′0t = λ
0
t γ
0(t)
∂0C
(
~γ(t)
)
C
(
~γ(t)
) , (5.11)
where ~γ(t) = (γ0(t), γ1(t), γ2(t)) .
(4-party Case): In the 4-party case with C = {0, 1, 2, 3}, we have
h′0t = 1{τ3>t}
∂0C
(
~γ(t)
)
C
(
~γ(t)
) + 1{τ3≤t} ∂0∂3C
(
~γC\{3}(t), γ3(τ3)
)
∂3C
(
~γC\{3}(t), γ3(τ3)
) (5.12)
h′3t = 1{τ3>t}
∂3C
(
~γ(t)
)
C
(
~γ(t)
) (5.13)
under (Q′,F′), and
h′′0t = 1{τ2>t}
∂0C
(
~γ(t)
)
C
(
~γ(t)
) + 1{τ2≤t} ∂0∂2C
(
~γC\{2}(t), γ2(τ2)
)
∂2C
(
~γC\{2}(t), γ2(τ2)
) (5.14)
h′′2t = 1{τ2>t}
∂2C
(
~γ(t)
)
C
(
~γ(t)
) (5.15)
under (Q′′,F′′).
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5.2 Numerical Examples
In this paper, we adopt Clayton copula just for its analytical tractability and easy inter-
pretation of its parameter [14]. Clayton copula belongs to Archimedean copula family,
whose general form is given by
C(~u) = φ[−1]
(
n∑
i=0
φ(ui)
)
, (5.16)
where the function φ(·) is called the generator of the copula, and φ[−1](·) is its pseudo-
inverse function. For Clayton copula, the generator function is given by
φ(u) = (u−α − 1)/α (5.17)
for α > 0, and hence we have
C(~u) =
(
−n+
n∑
i=0
(ui)−α
)−1/α
. (5.18)
For this copula, one can easily check that
γi
∂iC(~γ)
C(~γ)
=
(
C(~γ)
γi
)α
γi
∂i∂jC(~γ)
∂jC(~γ)
= (1 + α)
(
C(~γ)
γi
)α
, (5.19)
which means that the hazard rate jumps to (1+α) times of its value just before the default
of any other party.
In the following two figures, we have shown the numerical examples of the par premium
of the perfectly collateralized CDS under Clayton copula. For simplicity, we have assumed
continuous payment of the premium, and also assumed that the recovery rate Ri = 40%,
the collateral rate c = 0.02, and the marginal intensity λi of each name is constant.
In Fig. 1, we have shown the results of 3-party case for the set of maturities; 1yr, 5yr, 10yr
and 20yr. Here, the effective marginal intensity of each party λ
i
= (1− Ri)λi is given as
follows: (
λ
0
, λ
1
, λ
2)
=
(
200bp, 100bp, 120bp
)
.
The horizontal axis denotes the value of the copula parameter α. Considering the situation
where major financial institutions are involved, and recalling the events just after the
Lehman collapse, the significant jump of hazard rates seems possible. One can see that
there is meaningful deviation of the par CDS premium from the marginal intensity λ
0
even within the reasonable range of the jump size, or α.
If Fig. 2, we have shown the corresponding results for the 4-party case. Here, we have
set the effective marginal intensities as(
λ
0
, λ
1
, λ
2
, λ
3)
=
(
200bp, 30bp, 150bp, 75bp
)
.
In this case, we have modeled the situation where the investor has very high credit qual-
ity, which enters back-to-back trades with the two firms that have quite different credit
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Figure 1: Change of par CDS spread with Clayton copula parameter α.
worthiness. In the figure, we have used the solid lines for the trade with party-2, and the
dashed lines for the offsetting trade with party-3. The result tells us that the back-to-back
trades have non-zero mark-to-market value if the investor applies the same premium. This
fact is very important for a CCP. It tells us that, even under the very stringent collateral
management, the CCP has to recognize that it is not free from the ”risk”. It is, in fact,
free from the credit risk of the counter party, but still suffers from the contagious effects
from the defaults of its counter parties.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the pricing of CDS under continuous collateralization. We
have made use of the ”survival measure” to avoid the ”no-jump” condition required in the
previous work [9]. It allows us straightforward derivation of pricing formula of CDS under
various situations of collateralization.
In the later part, we have focused on the situation where the CDS is perfectly col-
lateralized. We have shown that there exists irremovable trace of the two parties in the
CDS price through their default dependence among the relevant names. For numerical
examples, we have adopted Clayton copula to show the change of the par CDS premium
according to the dependence parameter. The results have shown that there exists sig-
nificant deviation of the par premium from the marginal intensity of the reference entity
when the default dependence is high.
We should emphasize that these numerical calculations are solely for demonstrative
purpose. Because of the simplicity of the chosen copula, there is no way to assign different
dependence among the relevant names. The detailed analysis with dynamic underlying
processes, and more realistic dependence structure is left for our future research. How-
ever, we still think that our results are enough to demonstrate the importance of default
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Figure 2: Change of par CDS spread with Clayton copula parameter α.
dependence or contagious effects among the relevant names even under the very strin-
gent collateral management. This fact seems particularly important for the CCPs, where
the members are usually major broker-dealers that are expected to have very significant
impacts on all the other names just we have experienced in this crisis.
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